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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-4220
____________
ESTATE OF LOUIS W. CHANCE, JR.,
BY AMANDA HUMPHREYS AND LOUIS CHANCE, III,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,
Appellants
v.
FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL, INC.;
NIRANJANA SHAH, M.D.; JOSE A. ARAMBURO, JR., M.D.;
COMMISSIONER STANLEY TAYLOR;
JOYCE TALLEY, BUREAU CHIEF OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 05-cv-00449)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 2, 2009
Before: FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,* District Judge.
(Filed: June 23, 2009)

*

Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
DIAMOND, District Judge.
The Estate of Louis W. Chance, Jr. appeals from the District Court’s: (1) denial of
the Estate’s motions to compel discovery; and (2) grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees Stanley Taylor and Joyce Talley. We will affirm.
I.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Because we write primarily for the Parties, we will summarize only those facts
pertinent to our decision.
At the time of his death on September 23, 2003, Louis Chance was in the custody
of the Delaware Department of Correction (DOC) at the Webb Correctional Facility.
During his initial DOC medical screening, Chance denied both intravenous drug use and
exposure to HIV. A subsequent blood test administered by the DOC revealed that Chance
suffered from Hepatitis C. Chance’s autopsy revealed that he suffered from an
undiagnosed case of HIV/AIDS which made him susceptible to cryptococcal meningitis -the fungal disease that caused Chance’s death.
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The events leading up to Chance’s death began on September 8, 2003, when
Chance complained of a severe headache. (App. at 68.) Over the ensuing days, although
Chance occasionally refused medical treatment or was verbally abusive, he was
repeatedly seen by medical staff, including physicians, psychiatrists, an optometrist,
physician’s assistants, counselors, and nurses. (App. at 69, 75-87.) During these repeated
examinations, Chance’s vital signs were normal. On several occasions, the DOC
transferred Chance from Webb to the infirmary at the Harold R. Young Correctional
Institution to receive medical treatment. On September 22, 2003, an examination
revealed swelling of Chance’s optic disc. (App. at 86.) Prison physicians ordered a brain
scan on an “urgent” basis. Chance was found unresponsive in the early morning hours of
September 23, 2003 -- the day the scan was to take place -- and transferred to St. Francis
Hospital, where he died. (App. at 87.)
In their Amended Complaint, Chance’s mother and son, as his Estate’s
Administrators, proceeded against: (1) First Correctional Medical, Inc. (the company
with which the DOC had contracted to provide inmate medical care); (2) Chance’s
treating physicians; (3) former DOC Commissioner Stanley Taylor; and (4) Joyce Talley,
former Chief of the DOC Bureau of Management Services. The Estate subsequently
withdrew its claims against all defendants except Taylor and Talley, who, the Estate
alleged, were “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to system-wide unconstitutional deficiencies
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resulting from cost containment practices of the [DOC] and the fixed fee medical
contractor” (i.e., FCM). (Appellant’s Br. at 4.)
In May 2005, FCM terminated its contract with the DOC, which, in turn,
contracted with a new health care provider. (App. at 50.) In 2006, the United States
Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, investigated DOC conditions, and issued a Report concluding that the quality of
medical care at several DOC institutions -- including HRYCI -- was constitutionally
deficient. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. During discovery in the instant case, the Estate
sought from Taylor and Talley, inter alia, the production of some 26,000 documents the
DOC had provided to the DOJ.
Taylor and Talley provided the Estate with considerable discovery respecting both
the medical care DOC and FCM made available to all prisoners and the care that was
actually provided to Chance, including: “all of [Chance]’s medical records; documents
from the 2003 Medical Review Committee meetings that relate to Webb and HRYCI; the
grievance reports for Webb and HRYCI; budget documents for multiple years; the
Request for Proposals and bid responses for the Health Services contract (May 2002); the
bid rating and contract documents; accreditation documents from the National
Commission on Correctional Healthcare; and a list of the medical vendor employees for
Webb and HRYCI for 2003.” (No. 05-449, Doc. No. 76, at 1-2.) Because Taylor and
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Talley refused to produce the 26,000 documents provided to the DOJ in 2006, the Estate
moved to compel.
On June 15, 2007, the District Court granted the motions to compel in part,
ordering Taylor and Talley to produce all non-privileged documents relating to the “cost
of, and allocation of resources for, medical care in Department of Correction facilities, as
well as any document . . . that mentions the decedent,” and all non-privileged documents
“that relate to defendant Talley’s duties in general, and her knowledge in particular of the
quality of medical care provided at Webb and HRYCI during the year 2003.” (Id. at 2.)
The Court otherwise ruled that the Estate’s requests were overbroad and not likely to lead
to the production of relevant evidence.
On September 30, 2008, the District Court granted Taylor and Talley’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that: (1) there was no evidence indicating that Taylor or
Talley had anything to do with Chance’s death; and (2) the Estate had not presented any
evidence rebutting Taylor and Talley’s declarations that there was no policy or practice to
deny adequate medical care to inmates.
The Estate timely appealed the District Court’s discovery and summary judgment
Orders.
III.
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery for abuse of
discretion. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 778 (3d Cir. 2000).
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Our review of the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment is plenary,
and we apply the same standard as the District Court to determine whether summary
judgment was appropriate. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law”). We must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Shields, 254 F.3d at 481. The non-moving party “must introduce more than a
scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; [it] must introduce
evidence from which a rational finder of fact could find in [its] favor.” Woloszyn v.
County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
IV.
The Estate challenges the District Court’s refusal to compel the production of all
26,000 documents produced in 2006 to the DOJ. We conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion.
The discovery provided below enabled the Estate to explore fully its allegation that
unconstitutional cost containment policies and practices caused Chance’s 2003 death.
The additional materials the Estate sought included extensive documentation relating to
the vendor that succeeded FCM in 2005 and other materials that had nothing to do with
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this case. In these circumstances, the District Court correctly concluded that the Estate’s
demand for all 26,000 documents was overbroad. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 598 (1998) (“Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly.”). The Estate has not demonstrated that this ruling “deprived [it] of crucial
evidence, or otherwise constituted a gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental
unfairness.” Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing
Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, we reject
the Estate’s contention that the Court abused its discretion.
V.
The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
Liability for deliberate indifference does not attach to non-medical prison officials
-- like Taylor and Talley -- “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). There is no evidence indicating that Taylor and Talley
knew or had any reason to believe that prison medical staff were not treating or were
mistreating Chance.
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Deliberate indifference liability may also attach to non-medical prison
administrators who fail in their supervisory capacity over medical staff. To establish
supervisory liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a policy or
practice that created an unreasonable risk of an Eighth Amendment violation; (2) the
supervisor’s awareness of the creation of the risk; (3) the supervisor’s indifference to the
risk; and (4) that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from this policy or practice. Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (respondeat superior liability not available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). The Estate failed to make out any of these elements before the District Court.
See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118.
In these circumstances, the District Court properly granted Taylor and Talley’s
motion for summary judgment.
VI.
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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